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Abstract
Background: The Ontario health care system is devolving planning and funding authority to community based organizations
and moving from steering through rules and regulations to steering on performance. As part of this transformation, the Ontario
Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC) are interested in using incentives as a strategy to ensure alignment – that
is, health service providers' goals are in accord with the goals of the health system. The objective of the study was to develop a
decision framework to assist policymakers in choosing and designing effective incentive systems.
Methods: The first part of the study was an extensive review of the literature to identify incentives models that are used in the
various health care systems and their effectiveness. The second part was the development of policy principles to ensure that the
used incentive models are congruent with the values of the Ontario health care system. The principles were developed by
reviewing the Ontario policy documents and through discussions with policymakers. The validation of the principles and the
suggested incentive models for use in Ontario took place at two meetings. The first meeting was with experts from the research
and policy community, the second with senior policymakers from the MOHLTC. Based on the outcome of those two meetings,
the researchers built a decision framework for incentives. The framework was send to the participants of both meetings and
four additional experts for validation.
Results: We identified several models that have proven, with a varying degree of evidence, to be effective in changing or
enabling a health provider's performance. Overall, the literature suggests that there is no single best approach to create
incentives yet and the ability of financial and non-financial incentives to achieve results depends on a number of contextual
elements. After assessing the initial set of incentive models on their congruence with the four policy principles we defined nine
incentive models to be appropriate for use in Ontario and potentially other health care systems that want to introduce
incentives to improve performance. Subsequently, the models were incorporated in the resulting decision framework.
Conclusion: The design of an incentive must reflect the values and goals of the health care system, be well matched to the
performance objectives and reflect a range of contextual factors that can influence the effectiveness of even well-designed
incentives. As a consequence, a single policy recommendation around incentives is inappropriate. The decision framework
provides health care policymakers and purchasers with a tool to support the selection of an incentive model that is the most
appropriate to improve the targeted performance.
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The use of incentives in health care to improve perform-
ance is increasing rapidly worldwide. There are many rea-
sons for this, but two consistent themes are the need to
better align the incentives of providers with health system
goals and the need to re-configure incentives to support
new, devolved approaches to system governance. A con-
tinued misalignment between health service providers'
compensation and key system goals drives the failure to
deliver efficient and effective services for patient popula-
tions despite many efforts in the last decade to improve
performance [1-3]. As many countries change governance
principles of their health systems from rules and regula-
tions toward devolved, results-driven systems that empha-
size strategic planning and decision-making oriented
towards performance [4,5], they have realized that success
requires individuals and organizations in the system have
an incentive to act on information and use their capacities
to meet the heath system goals [6].
The health care system in the Canadian province of
Ontario is an example of such system. The Ontario Minis-
try of Health and Long-Term Care is devolving planning
and funding authority to community-based organiza-
tions, called Local Health Integration Networks (LHINs)
while moving itself into the role of a steward. Incentives
an integral part of the Ministry's efforts to ensure align-
ment across the Ontario health care system.
Using incentives to create alignment, however, is chal-
lenging because the link between incentives and the
behaviour of individuals or organizations is not always
straightforward. Evidence from a range of countries dem-
onstrates that, at the macro level, the method of provider
compensation influences practice patterns. A systematic
review by Chaix-Couturie et al. shows that financial incen-
tives have an impact on the use of health care resources,
including: admission rates to, and length of stay in, hospi-
tals; compliance with clinical practice guidelines; and
achieving general immunisation rates [7]. A second sys-
tematic review of the impact of payment methods on the
behaviour of primary care physicians found that those
paid on fee-for-service basis provided more services than
those paid by salary or by capitation [8]. At the micro
level, however, the evidence is ambiguous. A systematic
review of the impact of explicit financial incentives on
quality of care yielded mixed results with respect to
improving the processes and outcomes of care, access to
care, and patient experience of care in a variety of popula-
tions and care settings [9]. Similar observations can be
made with regard to public reporting as a tool to create
alignment [10,11]. Consequently, although incentives
can effect change, their effectiveness in eliciting the
desired results depends critically on several (often poorly)
understood aspects of the institutional environment in
which they are used [12,13]. This poses a challenge for
health care managers and purchasers who want to use
incentives to improve performance.
Recognizing this, the Ontario Ministry of Health and
Long-term Care developed a decision framework to assist
policy makers and system managers in both the Ministry
and the LHINs in designing effective incentive systems.
Central to the framework is a series of questions that must
be answered to identify what types of incentives can best
achieve the desired performance improvement in a man-
ner consistent with provincial values and principles.
This article presents the resulting framework which
addresses fundamental questions that need to be consid-
ered in selecting an incentive model. Although the frame-
work has been developed for the Ontario heath care
system, the rationale behind its development and ele-
ments can be applied in other jurisdictions facing similar
challenges. Development of the framework proceeded in
three key stages: a review of the incentive models used in
various health care systems and their effectiveness; devel-
opment of principles to ensure congruence between
incentive models and the values of the Ontario health care
system; and finally, the development of a structured series
of questions that form a decision-framework. A key con-
tribution of the decision framework is its focus on offering
explicit selection criteria that helps health care policy-
makers and purchasers committed to using incentives
identify the most appropriate incentive models to achieve
the desired performance improvement.
Methods
We identified incentive models and assessments of their
effectiveness used in various health care systems through
an extensive review of peer-reviewed literature on incen-
tives in health care, the economic and organizational lit-
erature on incentives and organizational change (both
empirical and theoretical) and other relevant publica-
tions. The literature search was conducted using a multi-
disciplinary database, ProQuest and a medical database,
Medline, employing the following key words either alone
and or in combination: "incentives", "motivation", "pay-
for-performance", "organizational change", "performance
management", "public reporting", "bonus", "return on
investment and quality/performance", "funding/payment
methods and quality/performance" and "quality and
costs". We identified additional relevant material through
the bibliographies of papers retrieved and by contacting
experts about missing or unpublished papers. In addition,
we searched the internet for information on incentives in
health care applying the same keywords as used in the
database searches as well as for additional background
information on incentive initiatives mentioned in the arti-
cles identified through the literature search. Our inclusionPage 2 of 14
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erature published between 1 January 1995 and 1 May
2006, with the exception of the theoretical literature
which we included regardless of publication date. In total
we reviewed 85 articles and documents; we concluded our
review once we felt that we had a comprehensive under-
standing of the literature and that further research would
not lead to new insights.
The second phase was to select incentive models that
seemed the most appropriate for the Ontario context
based on a set of policy principles. First, an initial set of
policy principles was developed by the primary researcher
through an iterative process of reviewing Ontario policy
documents and discussions with policymakers from the
Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care
(MOHLTC). Once the set of principles was articulated, an
analysis was done on the congruence of the various incen-
tive models with each of these policy principles. The deci-
sion as to whether a particular incentive model was
congruent was influenced by both the number of princi-
ples with which the model may conflict and the political
importance of any such policy principles. As a result,
some incentive models that conflicted with one or more
policy principles were selected while others that only con-
flicted with one policy principle were dismissed. The draft
set of principles and selected incentive models were pre-
sented at two meetings. The first meeting, held in May
2006, included 17 participants representing policymakers
from the ministry (10 participants), researchers (4 partic-
ipants) and health service providers (3 participants). The
results of this meeting then formed the basis for a second
meeting in June 2006 with 13 senior policymakers from
the MOHLTC. This meeting was part of a bi-weekly meet-
ing cycle that dealt with developing a comprehensive pol-
icy framework for health system performance
management in Ontario.
Following the two meetings, the analytic team led by the
principal researcher applied the chosen principles and rec-
ommendations about the appropriateness of the various
incentive models in building the draft decision frame-
work. In the fall of 2006 the decision framework with the
various incentive models was sent for comment and vali-
dation to participants of both meetings plus four addi-
tional experts in pay-for-performance, performance
improvement and organizational change who had not
participated in either meeting.
Results
Review of incentives, used in various health care systems, 
and their effectiveness
There is currently a wide range of new and established
programs, particularly in the US, that employ financial
and non-financial incentives to reward health service pro-
viders for achieving defined performance improvements
[2,3,14-16]. A prominent example is the Centers for Medi-
care and Medicaid Services (CMS), Premier Inc. Hospital
Quality Incentive Demonstration. Under this demonstra-
tion, that includes 268 hospitals, the highest-performing
hospitals receive a higher reimbursement (bonuses) while
the lowest-performing hospitals might be subject to with-
holds (penalties) based on their performance on a
number of evidence-based quality measures for patients
with heart attack, heart failure, pneumonia, coronary
artery bypass graft (CABG), and hip and knee replace-
ments [17]. In Europe, the English National Health Serv-
ice has introduced several incentive programs, ranging
from public recognition in the form of performance rating
of trusts, increased autonomy for high performing trusts,
and a bonus program for primary care practices [18,19].
In France, regional hospital agencies purchase hospital
services and contract with public and private hospitals
based on a range of structures, processes and outcome
indicators [20]. In the Netherlands one of the largest
health insurance companies has begun experimenting
with performance-related bonuses and withdrawals in its
contracts with hospitals, while another has introduced
bonuses for general practitioners delivering excellent dia-
betes care. Australia has introduced a bonus program rec-
ognizing general practices that provide comprehensive,
quality care, and that are either accredited or working
Table 1: Incentive models used in health care to change or enable an actors' behavior
Financial Non-financial
Direct - Bonus
- Performance based withhold
- Performance-based fee schedule
- Pay for activities
- Shared savings contracts
- Link regular payment (rate) increase to performance
- Quality grants/performance fund
- Financial award
- Auto assignment
- Public reporting/recognition (appeals to intrinsic motivation)
- Earned autonomy
- Managerial replacement
Indirect - Cost differentials for beneficiaries - Public reporting/recognition (appeals to patients who base their choice for a 
provider on quality)Page 3 of 14
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Incentive Model Lessons learned
1. Direct
1.1 Financial incentive models
Bonus Found some evidence that bonuses leads to performance improvement 
[24-29].
Bonuses are add-on money; provider can continue underperforming 
without negative consequences to the 'bottom-line'.
Bonuses are not suitable for the long term:
- funding with new money in times of raising health care costs not 
realistic.
- funding by re-allocating existing funds across providers increases risk 
for access and equity.
Performance based withhold Found limited evidence that it leads to performance improvement [60, 
65].
However, non-performance leads to loss of income; as such it could be 
a stronger incentive than bonuses because on average, people place 
more value on losses than equivalent gains [37, 66].
Risks of creating resistance from providers which might lead to 
dysfunctional effects [67].
Performance-based fee schedule Found very limited evidence that it leads to performance improvement 
[36].
Similar considerations as described under 'bonuses'.
Pay for activities Found limited evidence that it leads to performance improvement [68].
There is a risk that it might freeze existing practices.
There must be evidence that the activities that are subject to payment 
must lead to improved outcomes.
Shared savings contract Found limited evidence that it leads to performance improvement [63].
Funding by anticipated savings as a result of the improvement is difficult 
because savings might be too small to generate a meaningful incentive, 
differences between anticipated and actual spending could vary 
significantly from year to year or some improvements don't result in 
savings.
Link regular payment (rate) increase to performance Found limited evidence that it leads to performance improvement [61].
This might be partly explained by the fact that this method is relatively 
new.
In principle it doesn't need additional money or reallocation of existing 
funds across providers although, they demand a higher reimbursement 
rate for putting their income at risk.
The amount that is 'at risk' is relatively small, minimizing the risk of 
unintended consequences for patient care.
Due to the relatively small amount of funding in question, resistance 
from providers may be minimal.
Quality grants/Performance fund Found no evidence that it leads to performance improvement.
It is often used as a tool to encourage innovation or to promote 
infrastructure investment and capacity building.
Is not simple to administer.
Resource intensive for health care purchaser (e.g. eligibility assessments 
and evaluation).
Financial award Found no evidence that it leads to performance improvement.
Used as a tool to stimulate innovation and superior performance.
Because it is a one-time recognition, it doesn't overcome the 
misalignment caused by institutional arrangements.
Auto assignment Has not been explored; from the beginning it was clear that this model is 
not feasible in Ontario.
1.2 Non-financial incentive modelsPage 4 of 14
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of the incentive models used in health care that we iden-
tified in the literature. In addition to the distinction
between financial and non-financial incentives, a further
distinction can be made between direct and indirect
incentives. Direct incentive models are intended to
change the behavior of health service providers while
indirect incentive models are intended to affect the behav-
ior of health service providers through changes in the
patient's choice of provider. We will briefly describe the
most commonly used incentive models and their effec-
tiveness in the remainder of this paragraph.
Despite the number of initiatives, good evidence regard-
ing the effectiveness of these incentive programs is often
lacking. Many of the evaluations suffer from weak designs
that limit the ability to rule out other factors that may
have contributed to the observed effects [22]. Generaliza-
bility is limited by the fact that the interventions typically
occurred in a single location with unique characteristics.
The published evidence regarding the most commonly
used incentive models appears to yield mixed results
(Table 2).
Bonuses that reward providers with additional payments
for achieving stipulated performance targets account for
more than half of the current initiatives that link perform-
ance to payment, and are the most commonly used incen-
tive model in the US [16,23]. An increasing number of
studies suggest that such bonuses can improve perform-
ance in targeted areas [24-29]. The evidence is only sug-
gestive, however, because for some these studies the
effects are only partial [25] or there are limitations that
makes it difficult to assess the true impact of the bonus
program. These limitations are the lack of baseline includ-
ing a control for pre-intervention trends in performance
already occurring [26,30] or the lack of a concurrent con-
trol group [27] which means that the observed effects
might be at least partially the result of other factors like
increased monitoring. The evidence on the effectiveness
of bonuses to drive performance improvement also
includes studies indicating that bonuses had no effect at
all [31,32]. The variation in effectiveness across settings
may be due to a number of factors, including the small
size of the bonus in some settings [9,33] or the inability of
those targeted to affect the desired outcome [34]. While
such bonuses can be effective, they are often not cost-
effective: they must pay bonuses to practitioners who pre-
viously met the target in order to motivate the change at
the margin among those who did not. In some cases, the
majority of program resources go to those who already
met the desired standard in the absence of the incentive.
Public reporting (appeals to intrinsic motivation) Found evidence that it leads to performance improvement; however, 
only for those performance aspects reported upon [69-71].
Concerns for their public image appear to be a key motivator for 
improvement. Although professional pride is a motivator, more 
concrete financial incentive could also be influenced by changes in 
hospital reputation like for example a hospital's ability to raise funds or 
recruiting and retaining qualified physicians and nurses [71].
Despite some doubts at the hospital management level in the NHS 
about the validity of the performance rating system they found it useful 
as a lever to influence staff behavior [56].
In general hospitals don't undertake many actions after reporting 
performance. In particular if the performance is enough in the eyes of a 
hospital [72]; poor performing hospitals will more frequently undertake 
activities [73].
Earned autonomy No evidence found that it led to performance improvement.
Stakeholders appreciate a greater degree of freedom but the 
effectiveness is highly dependent on [39]:
- the nature of the freedom, which might lead to a conflict with a health 
care purchasers' effort for alignment.
- the actual degree of freedom or reduced oversight, which is dependent 
on legislative requirements or other stakeholders like for example 
unions or professional bodies.
- the commitment to award only those organization that perform well.
Managerial replacement No evidence found.
2. Indirect
2.1 Financial incentive models
Cost differentials for beneficiaries Has not been explored; from the beginning it was clear that this model is 
not feasible in Ontario.
2.2 Non-financial incentive models
Public reporting/recognition (appeals to patients who base their choice 
for a provider on quality)
No evidence found that it led to performance improvement; patients 
don't find the performance information of hospitals very useful [10, 11].
Table 2: Incentives – how effective are the most commonly used models (Continued)Page 5 of 14
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provided additional payments of up to 25 percent of a
practice's base income based on their performance with
respect to 146 quality indicators related to clinical care for
10 chronic diseases, organization of care, and patient
experience [35]. Although performance improved [26],
the question that raised was whether the large financial
investment – over 2 billion pounds – were an effective use
of health care systems' resources.
The primary difference between performance-based fee
schedules and bonuses is that the payment is ongoing
rather than one-time or periodic [36].
An alternative, budget-neutral, incentive scheme places
part of a providers' funding at risk based on the achieve-
ment of specified performance measures. Providers have
to repay a portion of their payment to the health care pur-
chaser if they fail to meet required performance levels
(penalty), or the purchaser can set aside performance-
related funding until a provider demonstrates that a
standard has been meet. Prospect Theory, which describes
how individuals evaluate potential losses and gains, sug-
gests that people react to changes from the status quo
rather than on final levels: individuals place more value
on losses than equivalent gains [37]. This suggests that
withholds or financial penalties may be more effective in
driving performance improvement than bonuses. Under
bonuses a provider is no worse off for not changing
behaviour (they have simply forgone an extra payment),
under withholds or penalties, a provider who fails to
change is worse off: they must go through major changes
just to maintain the status quo financially. The empirical
evidence on the relative effectiveness of bonuses and pen-
alties, however, is very limited. Negative incentives in the
form of penalties or putting parts of the funding at risk
based on performance are used less commonly than
bonuses in existing programs among U.S. State Medicaid
Programs [36], and their use is declining in new programs.
Medicaid directors judge that withholds or penalties are
detrimental to the operations of good incentive program
because it creates ill will between the medical community
and the state, which may result in decreases in provider
participation [36]. Provider resistance also inhibits the use
of withholds and penalties by health care purchasers and
where used, avoiding the penalty requires a relative low
level of performance improvement [13]. For example
CMS agreed that there would be no penalties in the first
two years and the 'penalty' threshold for the third year
would be set as performance at or below the 10th percen-
tile of the performance in the baseline year.
A variation on withholds is to place some or all of regular
funding increases at risk, so that future increases are
linked to performance. This model might overcome some
of the disadvantages of the withhold model and the
bonus model. Unlike withholds it doesn't affect current
funding levels which might reduce the resistance of health
service providers and unlike bonus it doesn't require addi-
tional funding. Linking regular funding increases to per-
formance would make over time the funding more
performance oriented over time.
The remaining financial incentive models are 'perform-
ance funds', 'financial award' and 'quality grants' are used
to stimulate innovation and to provide health service pro-
viders with the capacity to implement a quality-related
program or research (see Table 2). Unlike quality grants
and financial awards, performance funds are in general
not competitive. Despite their common use in various
health care systems, we were not able to find any evidence
regarding the effectiveness of these three models.
Evidence for the effectiveness of non-financial incentive
models such as public reporting and 'earned autonomy'
are even more mixed. Public reporting of the performance
of health service providers attempts to motivate perform-
ance improvement in two ways: by appealing to profes-
sional ethos and by harnessing market forces [38].
Although there is some evidence that public reporting can
be a catalyst to improve performance, the effect is variable.
The strength of the first pathway depends critically on the
values of a provider, the leadership of an organization and
the potential indirect consequences of being a poor per-
former as described in Table 2. However, intrinsic per-
formance driven by values or leadership can particularly
come under pressure if the economic incentives conflict
with the values. The intended discipline of market forces
is often weak because generally, patients don't use per-
formance information in selecting a provider or do not
have choice of providers because of capacity constraints
[11]. A recent US study suggests that public reporting can
be more effective when used in concert with financial
incentives [38]. Hospitals subject to both public reporting
and financial incentives improved quality more than hos-
pitals engaged only in public reporting [38].
Even less is known about the effectiveness of "earned
autonomy". Earned autonomy was introduced in the Eng-
lish NHS to create incentive for hospital trusts to meet
national performance targets [18,39]. Under the pre-
sumption that provider's value autonomy, the policy
offers a number of freedoms that fall into three broad cat-
egories: financial freedoms, reduction of the degree of
central monitoring and more involvement in policy mak-
ing [18]. Like public reporting, the incentive provided by
earned autonomy depends importantly on the motivation
of hospital managers. Unfortunately, earned autonomy as
currently designed in the NHS provides little incentive
effect for senior managers [39]; in part because a lack ofPage 6 of 14
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withholding autonomy reduced the credibility of the pol-
icy. In addition, earned autonomy doesn't address the
potential financial misalignment caused by a funding sys-
tem. As a result, earned autonomy seems to be a less
appropriate model as an incentive for high performance.
Risks of using incentives
Incentive schemes, both financial and non-financial,
always risk generating unintended consequences. The
principal type of unintended consequence is 'gaming',
where participants find ways to maximize measured
results without actually accomplishing the desired objec-
tive [40]. In healthcare, evidence of gaming was found in
England as a result of the introduction of an annual sys-
tem of publishing 'star rating' for public health care organ-
izations [41]. For example, to meet the target 'Time spent
waiting in accident & emergency' (emergency room) some
accident & emergency departments required patients to
wait in queues of ambulances outside until the hospital in
question was confident that that patient could be seen
within four hours [42]. Roski et al [43] examined the
effect of bonus payments on identifying patients with
tobacco-use disorders and providing tobacco use disor-
ders and providing tobacco cessation advice in large
multi-specialty group practices. The incentive was associ-
ated with an increased documentation of tobacco-use sta-
tus but not the provision of advice to quit smoking. If
incentives are based on outcomes that vary with disease
severity and inadequate risk adjustment there is a risk that
health service providers select patients on the basis of the
likelihood of a positive outcome. Shen [44] examined the
effect of performance-based contracting on access to care
among the most severely ill patients in a group being
treated for substance abuse. The study showed that fewer
clients with the greatest severity were treated in outpatient
programs with the implementation of performance-based
contracting suggesting that adverse selection was occur-
ring in response to the financial incentive.
A second major concern with incentive programs is
known in the economic literature as the multitasking
problem [40,45]. If the goal of the payer is multidimen-
sional and not all dimensions lend themselves [40] to
measurement, rewarding performance based on available
measures will distort effort away from unmeasured objec-
tives.
Finally, another risk of using incentives to drive perform-
ance in health care is the potential to undermine the
intrinsic motivation of people.
Although the risk of unintended consequences always
exists and difficult to predict, Smith [46] and Marshall
[47] identified a number of ways in which potential unin-
tended consequences may be reduced. Examples are
ensuring that the targeted health service providers are
involved in the development of the incentive scheme,
making use of existing, independent benchmarks if possi-
ble, seeking expert (both local and independent) interpre-
tation of the performance measures, continuing
evaluation of incentive systems and a process of feedback,
and auditing of data.
Overall, the literature review showed that the ability of
incentives to achieve the desired goals is neither direct nor
straightforward. Furthermore, individual and organiza-
tions are motivated by many factors internal and external
to their environment [9,12,33,48,49]. The effectiveness of
an incentive will depends on the presence or absence of
several key elements and as such, requires careful design
involving those to whom incentives are targeted and
ongoing evaluation of the effectiveness of the incentive
program and potential unintended consequences. These
findings are supported by other studies [9,33].
Congruence of incentive models with values of the Ontario 
health care system
It is essential that the incentive models used be congruent
with the values of the health care system. This was cer-
tainly true for the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-
term Care, which oversees the provincial public health
care system and whose work is therefore informed by a
strong value orientation. As noted above, the principles
used to identify congruent incentive models were drawn
from policy documents of the Ministry of Health and
Long-term Care and discussions with Ministry officials.
The following four principles were adopted: (1) be fiscally
prudent; (2) be simple to administer; (3) support a cul-
ture of continuous improvement, innovation and mutual
learning and; (4) improve equity in and access to quality
of health care services across all LHINs and health service
providers.
When the various incentive models were assessed accord-
ing to these four principles, the following models were
regarded as appropriate to encourage desired behaviour
and performance in LHINs and LHIN providers (see Table
3 for a summary of the analysis): (1) bonus; (2) pay for
activities; (3) enhanced payment; (4) funding (rate)
increases linked to performance; (5) financial award; (6)
gain sharing; (7) grant; (8) performance fund (9) finan-
cial awards and; (10) public reporting/recognition.
Some of the incentive models were included in the list
despite the fact that using them could harm one or more
policy principles. For example, unless bonuses are funded
through savings (which has its own limitations as shown
in Table 2), they will either lead to an additional increasePage 7 of 14
(page number not for citation purposes)
BMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:66 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/66in health care costs or, if funded through reallocation,
might lead to differences in access to high quality care.
Both are in principle undesired outcomes for Ontario pol-
icymakers. This makes it at first instance an inappropriate
model to reward high performance; in particular as a
reward on an on-going basis. However, for single and
short term performance initiatives, the principle of being
'fiscal prudent' might be softened. It is not uncommon for
policymakers to address a political priority by spending
additional funding for a limited period such as required
for initiatives e.g. to reduce wait times or to implement
system wide information technology.
The incentive model 'earned autonomy' was identified as
not appropriate even though it is congruent with three of
the four principles. The experience in the UK showed that
it's not simple to administer 'earned autonomy' [39]. Sec-
ond, there was an increased recognition among the poli-
cymakers that certain freedoms which they initially
regarded as a potential reward were actually driving forces
for performance and as such should be eligible for all pro-
viders regardless of performance. Finally, the evidence on
the effectiveness of 'earned autonomy' in creating change
was weak. As a result, it was determined that 'earned
autonomy' was not an appropriate incentive model for
Ontario
Choosing an incentive model in a given context: a decision 
framework
Choosing an incentive model and designing a specific
incentive scheme are difficult tasks. The previous two
steps led to a reduction of the number of acceptable incen-
tive models that are used in various health care systems
worldwide to nine models that have proven to be effective
and that are congruent with the policy principles. The next
step is to identify when each of these incentive models
represents the best choice. We developed a decision
framework to assist planners within both the Ministry and
the LHINs in this task. The framework consists of series of
related question set out in a decision tree (Figure 1). We
consider these questions in turn and included an example
related to diabetes care to illustrate the functioning of the
decision tree.
The first question is to define the goals that a health care
purchaser wants to accomplish through the incentives
(what to improve?). An incentive scheme can't motivate
health service providers to "do the right thing" if it is
unclear what the right thing is. An example of a goal
around diabetes care would be: 'providing comprehensive
diabetes care in terms of appropriate and timely screening
and treatment to reduce the risk of complications such as
heart disease, blindness, and kidney disease'.
Having defined the key objectives, the second step is to
ask whether there is a need for incentives. Poor perform-
ance can stem, in part or wholly, from a number of factors
like the lack of knowledge, awareness, attitude or motiva-
tion of a health service provider, knowledge or patient
attitudes, leadership, the attractiveness of an innovation
or the economic and political context [50]. It is essential,
therefore, to analyze why the system is currently under-
performing and the potential role of incentives in improv-
ing performance. The need for introducing incentives or
for altering existing incentives arises when current incen-
tives reward undesired behaviour and fails to reward
desired behaviour [51,52]. In our diabetes example, to
provide comprehensive diabetes care, physicians need to
Table 3: Summary analysis
Principle Consequences for selecting incentives Recommendation
(1) Be fiscally prudent Incentives should not lead to additional costs 
for the health care system (no new money).
Exclude funding of bonuses/enhanced payment 
through new money without added value or 
without future savings.
(2) Be simple to administer Incentive should be easy to implement and 
ideally be executed within existing policies, 
regulation and legislation.
Exclude 'Flexible oversight/greater autonomy' 
as an incentive as its design and implementation 
are too complex or might conflict with existing 
legislation or regulations.
(3) Improve equity in access to quality of 
health care services across Ontario
Incentives should not lead to differences in 
access to quality of health care services; 
instead, if possible, strengthen equity.
Exclude withhold of existing funding based on 
performance.
Exclude bonus/enhanced payment funding via 
reallocation of funding from low to high 
performers.
(4) Support a culture of continues 
improvement, innovation and mutual 
learning
Incentives should:
- not lead to tensions between ministry – LHIN 
and LHIN – health service providers.
- focus on learning and improving rather than 
blaming.
- encourage the sharing of best practices across 
LHINS and LHIN providers.
Exclude withholding of existing funding based 
on performance.
Design public reporting in such a way that it 
prevents a "shame and blame" culture.Page 8 of 14
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pressure and lipid control, annual foot examination,
annual tests of diabetic kidney disease, aspirin therapy for
primary prevention in adults at increased risk for cardio-
vascular disease and smoking cessation counselling [53].
Neither fee-for-service nor capitation necessarily aligns
incentives well (FFS may not compensate some of these
activities well: capitation provides a general disincentive
to provide services [8]). As a consequence, the lack of
alignment makes incentives a potentially fruitful strategy
to increase performance.
The third question in the decision-framework is whether
incentives are part of an accountability agreement or used
to promote the implementation of a single strategic
improvement initiative. Accountability agreements gener-
ally outline, among other things, clear descriptions of
responsibilities, objectives, performance expectations and
measures and reporting requirements. Incentives can be
tied to the performance expectations. In this context, the
purpose of incentives would be to strengthen the account-
ability agreement. Incentive can also be linked to qualita-
tive and quantitative goals of a single strategic
improvement initiative with the aim of ensuring quick
and broad implementation. The context in which incen-
tives occur have implications for the choice of models. For
example, the incentive model 'linking regular rate
increases to performance' might, be difficult to realize for
those improvement initiatives that are not part of an
agreement as funding issues are subject to agreements.
Bonuses might be appropriate for limited-term initial
improvement initiatives but not to reward high perform-
ance on an on-going base. In our diabetes example we
assume that the goal of providing comprehensive care is
one of the performance expectations that are formulated
in an accountability agreement.
The fourth question in the decision framework is the
question whether the desired performance can be quanti-
fied. It is critical that the action or outcome tied to the
Decision framework for selecting incentivesFigure 1
Decision framework for selecting incentives.
Single strategic improvement initiative
(time limit) 
Accountability agreement
• Pay for activities
• Grant / Financial award
• Public recognition
• Savings from efficiency
• Pay for activities
• Grant / Financial award
• Public recognition
• Performance fund • Performance fund
• Public Recognition
• Gain sharing
• Savings from 
efficiency
• Link funding increase 
to performance
• Bonus including ROI for 
costs of compliance
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objective. The usefulness of a performance measure in an
incentive program will depend on its measurability and
distortion [54]. An incentive can only be linked to what is
measurable; it provides an incentive to do whatever is
being measured. Measurability refers to a range of techni-
cal criteria that performance measures must pass [45]. Key
among these are validity (does the measure capture what
it is supposed to?), reliability (how reproducible are the
measures when taken at different times or in different cir-
cumstances?), and responsiveness to change (will the
measure discriminate between good and poor quality and
be able to detect small but worthwhile improvements?).
Distortion occurs when the performance measures incent
a provider to take actions that are not congruent with the
goals of the health care purchaser [16,55]. In many situa-
tions, the total value of an organization or health care sys-
tem is not contractible, and thus cannot serve as the basis
for an incentive contract [56]. For these reasons, most
incentive contracts are based on measures other than the
total value of the organization or health care system. The
risk is that the marginal product of each type of action on
the performance measure may differ from the marginal
product of this action on the total value [55]. Some argue
that when performance is unobservable (so there is a high
risk of distortion) or the measures are technically not
sound, it may be best to either reduce the incentive inten-
sity to mitigate the risk that agents misdirect effort [57] or
even to use no incentives for rewarding performance at all
[45]. In our example, 'improving comprehensive diabetes
care' can be measured through for example the indicators:
A1C poor control > 9.0%, A1C control ≤ 7.0%, BP control
< 140/90 mm Hg and LDL control < 130 mg/dL [58].
The fifth question in the decision framework is that of
how incentives will improve performance. Health care
purchasers can use incentives to enable or reward high
performance. Enabling refers to the notion that high per-
formance not only depends on the motivation but also on
the ability to perform well. Rewarding performance
reflects the common understanding on the role of incen-
tives: to motivate high performance. Often, health service
providers are motivated to perform well but are prevented
from doing it by the current institutional arrangement.
Being a high performer might increase costs for a provider
[59]. For example, freeing up staff time, creating new posi-
tions like a director of quality and investing in education
and information technology all increase costs in the short-
term. The absence of a return on investment (ROI) on
these costs or loss of income can form a barrier for pursu-
ing the targeted performance improvement. In those
cases, the focus of incentives is not on rewarding providers
but to provide them with the necessary resources to
become a high performer. The choice on how a health
service provider can be compensated for its investments
depends on the feasibility of information (see step four).
If performance information is feasible, the investments
can be compensated in both contexts (accountability
agreement and single strategic initiative) by higher pay-
ments once the performance has improved. If perform-
ance information can't be quantified, the investments can
be compensated with the help of a performance fund.
Incentives for rewarding and recognizing high perform-
ance goes one step further as it recognizes differences in
performance by making a high performer better-off
(either financially or non-financially) than an underper-
former. A distinction can be made between recognizing
and rewarding high performance. The purpose of recogni-
tion is to encourage organizations to put discretionary
effort into the way they are functioning and to deliver
superior performance. The difference with rewards is that
recognition celebrates a one-time event while rewards are
used to set direction and reinforce change [60]. The mod-
els that can be used to recognize high performance are:
grants, financial awards or public recognition.
The choice on how to reward high performance will
depend on two premises; first, as for enabling perform-
ance, on the ability to quantify performance and second,
the context in which the performance expectation is for-
mulated (see question 3). If the desired outcome is diffi-
cult to quantify, a health care purchaser can reward high
performers by paying for activities (processes) that have
proven to contribute to the desired outcome. Unlike out-
come information, information on performed activities
can often easily be obtained from administrative data-
bases. If the desired outcome can be quantified, the selec-
tion of the reward will depend on the context. In the
context of an accountability agreement the following
incentive models combined are regarded as the most
appropriate for rewarding high performers: (1) rate
increase linked to enhanced performance; (2) public
reporting and (3) savings from efficiency. 'Rate increase
linked to enhanced performance' has two desirable fea-
tures. First, similar as a withhold model, providers need to
improve to maintain the status quo with regard to their
bottom-line; however, unlike withholds, the risk of nega-
tive consequences for equity, access and resistance from
health service providers might be lower as it on gradually
makes the funding more performance oriented. Second, it
doesn't require additional money and is therefore budget-
conscious (although organizations might require a higher
compensation for bearing the risk [45]). Public reporting
strengthens the incentive to improve performance and
more importantly, it increases accountability and edu-
cates the public about differences in health care. Finally,
allowing organization to keep the surplus as a result of
improved performance creates an incentive to improvePage 10 of 14
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care and develop innovative programs.
For incidental improvement projects or strategic priority
projects with a short term, the use of bonuses is more
appropriate in recognizing or rewarding accomplish-
ments. Bonuses are easier to implement and generally do
not require negotiations or rewriting existing contracts.
Participation in a bonus program can also be established
on a voluntary basis.
In the context of the diabetes care example it was deter-
mined that performance should be improved by reward-
ing high performance. As the performance expectation is
part of an accountability agreement, the incentive is that
providers will only receive the full rate increase when they
improve their comprehensive diabetes care as measured
by a set of indicators. The percentage of the rate that is at
risk based on performance is subject to negotiation. In
addition, their performance will be made public in com-
parison to other health service providers.
The sixth question addresses issues similar to those asso-
ciated with enabling performance. The question is
whether there are costs of compliance. Even if the purpose
of the incentive is to reward high performance, the
response of a provider to a reward will be influenced by
their costs of performing the tasks necessary to improve.
To be effective and to prevent undesired behaviour like
gaming or tunnel vision, the reward needs to address
these additional costs in its design. For example, the US-
based Leapfrog Group helped payers determine how large
a financial bonus is required to motivate hospitals to
implement identified 3 patient safety practices. The work
takes into account the hospital's cost of implementing the
safety practice and the type of reimbursement structure
(per-diem, case-rate, etc) [61]. In the context of an
accountability agreement, the 'costs of compliance' can be
compensated through higher payments; in the context of
a single strategic improvement initiative, with feasible
performance information, the costs of compliance need to
be reflected in the size of the bonus.
In our example, improving diabetes care increase costs not
well compensated by the current funding system, hence,
the incentive will include enhanced payment (marginal
costs) if performance targets are met.
The seventh question is whether there are savings for the
health care purchaser. Various studies show that perform-
ance improvements can lead to savings for the purchaser
or society [62]. In general health care purchasers can use
the anticipated savings from the performance improve-
ment as guidance on how big the bonus should be as is
done for example by the Alliance in Wisconsin [63]. Using
anticipated savings to reward high performers places great
emphasis on those performance improvement initiatives
that will lead to efficiencies and program savings. This
makes it less appropriate as a source for rewarding
increased patient centeredness or clinical quality. In some
situations, the amount of savings might be too low to
motivate change. Finally the savings can fluctuate which
threatens the sustainability of the program. We believe
therefore that the anticipated savings should be regarded
in the context of an accountability agreement as a bonus
in addition to the other more sustainable incentives
already identified: rate increase linked to enhanced per-
formance, public reporting and savings from efficiency.
Instead of being the sole incentive, sharing the savings in
the system strengthens existing incentives, and similar to
a performance fund, provide organizations with addi-
tional resources to develop and implement new initiatives
to improve their performance. In a non-contractual con-
text, the savings can be used to guide the size of the bonus.
With regard to our example, studies have shown that
improving diabetes care can lead to savings for the health
care purchaser of up to 10–15% per patient per years. As a
consequence, the health care purchaser is willing to share
part of savings with those health providers who improved
their comprehensive diabetes care.
Implementation, evaluation and monitoring
In general, to generate behavioural change, incentives
must be implemented together with tools and informa-
tion such as education, support to facilitate the adoption
of best practices and technical assistance. The health care
purchaser needs to provide feedback to the health service
providers on their performance and possible corrective
action through dialogue between the parties [64].
The use of explicit incentives in health care is still quite
recent, the collective knowledge base regarding their
design and effectiveness is limited, and so their develop-
ment remains largely a learning-by-doing process. This,
together with the risk of unintended consequences, means
that an incentive program needs to be monitored, evalu-
ated, and improved on an on-going base. Two questions
must be asked during the design phase to assure that the
implementation of the program will support meaningful
evaluation[13]: first, how can a health care purchaser tell
if the incentive program is working; and what are poten-
tial unintended consequences. Demonstrating the effec-
tiveness of an incentive program, requires a good research
design, preferably with an appropriate control group, and
good baseline data on the targeted quality measures. Only
then can the main effect of the program can be evaluated
in terms of change in performance compared either to
unaffected population or the trend in performance prior
to implementation [13]. To address the second question,Page 11 of 14
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performance indicators that are outside of the incentive
program [13].
The use of incentives requires ongoing adjustments to the
program including modifying goals that lead to new
measures and targets, adding or retiring measures once
performance has topped out, adjusting targets for existing
measures, and modifying the reward structure.
Conclusion
Good performance depends on several factors, including
the capacity to perform well, the availability of informa-
tion and the motivation of an agent. The principle pur-
pose of incentives is to motivate an agent (e.g. health
service provider) to perform well when judged by the
objectives of the principal (e.g. health care purchaser).
This includes providing a provider with the incentive to
develop the capacity to perform well, to acquire the right
information, and to then act on it accordingly. Too often
current systems of funding in health care fail to provide
such incentives; indeed, it can directly frustrate the efforts
of well-motivated health service providers trying to do the
right thing, becoming itself a major barrier to good per-
formance. The purpose of incentives in this article is there-
fore not only to motivate high performance by rewarding
desired behaviour but also to provide health care provid-
ers with the capacity to leverage change.
Creating effective incentives is difficult. The design of the
incentive must reflect the values and goals of the health
care purchaser, be well matched to the performance objec-
tives and reflect a range of contextual factors that can
influence the effectiveness even well-designed incentives.
Incentive design can be likened to building a house: forms
follow function and the design of an incentive scheme
depends on what you want from it.
The purpose of the decision framework presented in this
paper is to assist health care purchasers in identifying the
incentive model that is the most appropriate to improve
the targeted performance. It is designed to prompt analy-
sis and thought, not replace them. It can also support the
communication between a health care purchaser and a
health service provider. It opens the dialogue about what
is expected, what is required from a provider's perspective
and how a health care purchaser can provide these
requirements to enable providers to deliver value. Key les-
sons from the literature on the use of incentives (both in
health care and other sectors), are that no incentive model
is appropriate for every context and that there is no single,
best approach to create incentives for performance
improvement. The decision framework therefore empha-
sizes fundamental questions that should be answered. It is
flexible, tries to be balanced, reflects current knowledge,
and is not meant to be applied mechanically as if it could
automatically produce answers.
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